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EQUITABLE SERVITUDES.1 
SPECIFIC performance of restrictions upon property before Tulk v. Moxhay. Before the decision in Tulk v. Moxhay2 a 
contract not to use land in a particular nianner was treated by 
equity courts in the same way as were other negative contracts; if 
the plaintiff was so injured ·in the enjoyment of his own land that 
damages at law did not furnish an adequate remedy, equity would 
specifically enforce the contract by granting an injunction against 
the promisor.8 The right thus to control the use of the property 
in the hands of the promiser can hardly be classified as other than 
a property right,' but since it was enforcible only against the prom-
iser it was a property right that could be easily destroyed by any 
alienation of the property and therefore was of relatively small 
value. 
Tulk v. Moxhay. In Tulk v. Moxhay the plaintiff, who was the 
owner of a piece of vacant ground in Leicester Square and also of 
several of the houses forming the square, sold the vacant piece to 
one Elms, the deed containing a covenant by Elms that he, his 
heirs and assigns would keep the piece of ground in its then state, 
uncovered with any buildings, etc. The piece of land passed by 
several mesne conveyances into the hands of the defendant whose 
purchase deed contained no similar covenant with his vendor, but 
he had notice of the original covenant when he made his purchase. 
The covenant did not run at law against the transferee of Elms be-
cause it was not connected with an easement; furthermore, there 
was not only no common law property right but there was not even 
a contract right against the defendant, because the defendant had 
made no such covenant with any one. The defendant having mani-
fested an intention to alter the character of the land and having 
asserted a right to build thereon, the plaintiff sought and obtained 
an injunction against his doing so. Such a right as equity declared 
s The substance of this article will appear in a forthcoming book on Equity. 
• (1848) 2 Phi!lipR 714- Altho Tulk v. Moxbay iR the leading ca.•e on the subject, the 
point had already been decided in Whatman v. Gibson (1838) 9 Simon.q 106. It wa.< a; 
sale of lots under a building scheme and the restrictions were mutual. The court did not: 
say anything about unjust enrichment but merely pointed out the advantage to all the 
proprietors of preserving the residential character of the neighborhood. The case of 
Mann v. Stephens (1846) 15 Simons 377, also antedates Tulk v. Moxhay; it varies in facts 
from Tulk v. Moxhay only in that the assignee entered into a similar covenant with the 
original covenantor. The reasoning of the court is not reported. 
•Martin v. Nutkin (1724) a P. Wms. 266 (promise not to ring a bell); De Wilton 
v. Saxon (1801) 6 Ves. 106 (not to break up mowi02 land). 
' For example, it would logically pass on the plaintifi's death to his heir rather than 
to bis executor. 
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belonged to the plaintiff as against the defendant in this case was 
formerly called an equitable easement5 ; It is now more common 
to call it a covenant running with the land in equity. Since such 
restrictive agreements are recognized by equity as creating property 
rights in chattels as· well as in land, while the common law recog-
nizes no easements or covenants as giving property rights in chattels, 
it avoids confusion and misapprehension to call them by the more 
general term of equitable servitudes. . 
Argument of the court in Tulk v. Mo.xhay. The court in Tulk 
v. Mox hay seemed to rest their decision on the ground that if such 
a right were not recognized and enforced there would be unjust 
enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff. Where the parties in 
the different transactions after the purchase and covenant by Elms 
supposed that the restriction was binding on transferees and fixed 
the price of the property accordingly, unjust enrichment of the 
defendant would result if the restriction were not enforced against 
him. And where those same parties supposed that the restriction 
was not binding on transferees and fixed the price according to that 
understanding, urijust enrichment would result to the covenantor 
if the restriction were enforced against the defendant. On the other 
hand, where there is no misapprehension by the parties as to the 
legal rule there is no unjust enrichment of any one beta.use the 
price of the property will be fixed according to the enforcibility or 
non-enforcibility of the restriction. Consequently the decisions en-
forcing equitable servitudes against transferees can be rested on 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment only in the rather abnormal case 
where the parties were mistaken as to the law. Oddly enough, it 
has been the orthodox doctrine-now happily disappearing-that 
equity would give no relief against a mistake of law.8 At the pres-
ent day courts usually pay no attention to the question of unjust 
enrichment in restrictive agreement cases. 
A decision which shows that unjust enrichment is not the basis 
of equitable servitudes is that of Rogers v. Hosegood.1 In that case 
•At common iaw there were five kinds of rights which one might have in the land of 
anotber,-i. e., rights which could be enforced against the present or any future owner of 
the land: (a) legal charges, (b) natural rights, such. as rights· adjacent and subjacent sup-
port, (c) easements, (d) profits, and (e) covenants running with the land. Equitable 
servitudes on land are similar in some respects to common law easements, but there a;c 
some points of difference which will be pointed out later in the article. 
41 The usual reason given for denying relief was that everyone was presumed to know 
the law-an unfortunate miAAtatcrnent of the rule that ignorance of the law does not 
excuse one who has in some way incurred a prima facie legal liability; for example, by 
committing a crime or tort or a breach of contract. The rule should not he applied to one 
who has incurred no such liability but se~ AA plaintiff to be relieved from the conse-
ouence$ of bi.q error. 
T (1900) a Cb. 388. 
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it was held that a tratisferee of the covenantor was entitled to en-
force an equitable servitude on the defendant's property tho the 
plaintiff knew nothing of the restriction when he bought his prop-
erty from the covenantee. 
Real basis of Tulk v. Mox hay. The court in Tulk v. M oxhay 
reasoned in a circle. Whether there was unjust enrichment of the 
defendant at the expense of the plaintiff depended upon the extent 
of the plaintiff's right; i.e., upon whether the plaintiff could enforce 
the restrictive agreement against only the coYenantor or whether 
he could also enforce it against the transferees of the land. Tho 
the reasoning in Tulk v. M oxhay is unsound the decision has been 
followed with practically no adverse criticism and we must there-
fore find some other reason for it so that we may fit it in with 
other parts of the legal system. This reason is found in the in-
adequacy of the commo~ law with reference to rights in another's 
land,8 together with the almost total lack of governmental super-
vision of building in Anglo-American countries. Tho it might be 
much better to have municipal control of the use of land than to en-
force restrictions imposed by private individuals, such control by 
private individuals has on the whole been beneficial in the last half 
century's rapid growth of cities. 
Who are bound by equitable servitudes? A common law ease-
ment or profit was enforcible against any successor in title tho he 
paid value in good faith.9 But like other equitable rights the bene-
fit of an equitable servitude may not be enforced against a bona 
fide purchaser.10 Tho a common law covenant running with the 
•The common law rules< with reference to such risi:htio were auite risi:id. For example, 
covenants runninsi: with the land bound only those who succeeded to the e.•tate of the 
covenantor and could be created only where there was privity of estate; in this connection 
privity of estate was said to exist where there was an easement of profit or where there 
was the relation of grantor and grantee or that of lessor and lessee. Covenants running 
with the land usually occurred in leases. The most common ones running with the land 
against transferees were covenants to pay rent, to repair, to rebuild, not to use premises 
in· a certain way, and not to assign the lease; those running with the land against the 
lessor's transferees were covenants to rebuild and covenants to renew the lease. Iri 
England covenants probably do not run against the transferee except in case of landlord 
and tenant. Tiffany, Real Property, § 3# 
9 Easements and profits are, however, generally required by modem registry acts in 
this country to be recorded; hence, in the absence of such a record, a bona fide purchaser 
will be protected. Armor v. Pye (1881) 25 Kan. 731; Taylor v. Millard (1890) u8 
N.Y .. 244-
11 Independent of the recording acts. common law rights were enforcible against every· 
one while equitable rights were not enforcible against bona fide purchasers. But wherever 
the registry statutes apply there is. a new line of division; if the right, whether common 
law or equitable, is recorded according to the statutory provisions, it is enforcible against 
all; if it is not so recorded, it is not enforcible against bona fide purchasers or attaching 
creditors. It has been generally held that the registry statutes allow and therefore require 
the recording of equitable servitudes; where, therefore, they have been properly recorded 
they are enforcible regardless of actual notice. See 18 Harv. Law Rev. 535. 
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land was enforcible only against one who succeeded to the estate of 
the covenantor, there is no such limitation upon the enforcement of 
equitable servitudes. In Abergarw Brewery Co. v. Holmes"- there 
was a covenant in a mortgage not to buy wines, beers, etc., from 
.any one except the mortgagee; the restriction was enforced against 
an under-lessee with notice,12 on the ground that it was the in-
tention of the parties to bind every one claiming under the 
mortgagor. In order to protect the defendant in such a case the 
<lecree would of course be made conditional upon the mortgagee's 
~omplying with his promise to furnish the liquor. 
It has long been considered as settled that one who obtains title 
from a trustee by adverse possession is entitled to hold it against 
the cestui que trust even though he knew of the trust.13 On the 
other hand, one who obtains title by adverse possession of property 
subject to an equitable servitude does not thereby destroy the servi-
tude even tho he had no notice of it.14 The only way in which he 
~n get rid of the servitude is by getting a release or by violating 
it and having the Statute of Limitations run in his favor.15 The 
-reason for the distinction seems to be this: the holder of the equit-
able servitude is not interested in the ownership of the servient 
property but merely in the way the property is used; hence his 
rights have not been infringed till the property is used in a way 
inconsistent with the servitude. Or, to state it differently, while it 
-is a breach of trust for the trustee to convey the trust property to 
.any one without the consent of the cestui que trust or an order of 
court because he owes a fiduciary duty to protect and administer 
the property for the cestui, the holder of property subject to an 
-equitable servitude is not a fiduciary to that extent; he may alien 
freely except that he must not destroy the servitude by conveying 
to a bona fide purchaser for value.16 A fortiori, one who has dis-
seised the owner of the servient property but has not yet acquired 
title is bound by the servitude.17 
l1 (r900) l Ch. 188. 
"If he had not had notice, aliter; Carter v. Williams (r870) L. R. 9 Eq. 678. 
n Wych v. East India Co. (1734) 3 P. Wms. 309. 
1• In re Nisbet and Potts' Contract (1906) l Ch. 386. It is not clear whether the 
-court did or did not regard notice as material. It should have been regarded as imma-
1erlal. See 18 Harv. Law Rev. 608. 
10 In this respect the holder of the equitable servitude is treated just as if he had a 
-common law easement or profit. 
11 His position is similar to that of the owner of land subject to an equitable charge. 
'The position of an unpaid vendor who has a right to specific performance is also 
.11nalogous. 
1
' Mander v. Falcke (189r) .2 Ch. 554. The court mentions the fact that he bad 
notice; since he paid nothing for the land it would seem that be ought to be bound even 
.if be had not had notice. 
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Influence of Tulk v. Mo.xhay on promisot"s common law liability~ 
Indirectly the decision in Tulk v. M o.xhay has apparently affectecf 
the promisor's copunon law liability. In order to make it clear that: 
the parties intended that the· restriction should bind transferees it 
is now usual for the promisor to promise not only for himself but· 
also for "his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns". It seems 
now to be assumed that this form of undertaking not only has the· 
effect of making the restrictions enforceable in equity against trans- . 
ferees but also of making the promisor himself liable at common. 
law for any violation of the restriction by transferees.18 But a sub-
sequent transferee with notice who does not bind himself by con-· 
tract with reference to the servitude is liable at common law for in-· 
fringements ·by his alienee OJJly if he authorizes such infringe-· 
ments.19 
Who may enforce equitable servitudes. In determining the ques-
tion as to who may enforce equitable servitudes, ~quity will usually 
carry out the intentions of the parties,-either express or implied 
from all the circumstances of the case. While it is usually the in-
tent to benefit not only the promisee as present owner of land in the-
vicinity, but also to benefit any future owner of such land, the parties. 
may intend that the restriction be of less duration. In Renals v . 
.C owlishaw20 the devisees in trust for the sale of a mansion house· 
and_ residential property known as the Mill Hill estate and of cer-
tain pieces of land adjoining thereto, sold and conveyed two of these 
11 Hall v. Ewin (1887) 37 Ch. Div. 74, semble. Even before Tulle v. Moxhay there 
was nothing to prevent a promisor from undertaking to be liable for acts done by his: 
transferee; but at any time it would seem that the promise should not be construed as'· 
-including such an extensive undertaking in the absence of clear evidence of intent. The-
mere fact that he promises "for his executors and administrators" ought not to be con-
clusive because the phrase may have been used as a mere form; his e.""<ecutor or adminis-
trator, of course, would be responsible in any event for a breach committed by him while 
he held the ·land. In Clark v. Devoe (1891) 124 N. Y. 120, a deed from the defendant of 
a lot in New York City, after reciting that the grantee was the owner of an adjoining-
lot, contained a covenant on his part, "for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators-
and assigns • • • that he will not erect or cause to be erected, on said lot, • • * any 
building which shall be regarded as a nuisance, or which shall be occupied ·for any purpose 
which inay render it a nuisance". The defendant conveyed the adjoining lot to X by a? 
deed without any restriction; X erected a building which was used as a livery stable. In: 
an action on the covenant for damages the court held that the covenant should not be so. 
construed as to make the. defendant liable for the act of X, because of the "serious result 
to the · grantor with but slight benefit to the grantee". The dictum of the court that the 
covenant did not create an eauitable "ervitude M as to bind tran•fereu i•. however. un-
sound: instead of reauirinit clear IanmaR:e to make the re.•triction enforcible bv injunction· 
against transferees, it wauld and should tak,e clear language to limit the duration of the 
restriction to the time that the covenantor io owner of the property, because of the com-
paratively small v:Uue of a rutriction thuo limited. 
:it Hall v. Ewin (1887) 37 Ch. Div. 74-
• (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125. See ~o Badger v. Boardman (1860) 16.Gray 559, 
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adjoining pieces of land to one Shaw, who covenanted, among 
other things, that the property should be used for private dwellings 
only and not for any trade or business. The conveyance did not 
state that the covenant was for the protection of the residential 
property or make any reference to the other adjoining pieces of 
land. The same trustees also sold other pieces of land adjoining: 
the Mill Hill estate, similar conveyances being made. The trustees 
later sold and conveyed the Mill Hill estate to Bainbrigge who .died, 
and his devisees in trust sold and conveyed to the plaintiff. The 
pieces of land conveyed to Shaw came by several mesne convey-
ances into the hands of the defendants who carried on the trade of 
wheelwrights, smiths, and bent timber manufacturers and had 
erected a high chimney which emitted thick, black smoke, thus in-
juring the residential character of the neighborhood. The plaintiff 
was refused an injunction on the ground that the restriction w:as 
not meant to benefit the property, i. e., the subsequent owners, but 
merely to benefit the covenantees "to enable them to make the most 
of the property which they retained". 
If the intent of the parties was that ·the restriction should exist 
only as long as the covenantees should hold the land, the decision 
seems unimpeachable. But it ought to be pointed out that to refuse 
to protect the transferees in such a case very largely wipes out the 
commercial value of the restriction to the covenantee unless the 
trans£ eree erroneously supposed he would be protected; for if at 
the time he contracted to buy he knew that he could not as purchaser 
of the land enforce the restriction, he obviously would pay littler 
if any, more than if there had been no restriction. The chief value 
of the restriction, therefore, is merely to keep the premises free 
till a sale could be made.21 On the other hand, if the intent was 
clear to limit the duration of the restriction to the period of the 
trustees' ownership of the Mill Hill estate and the purchasers of 
the lots thus understood it and bargained accordingly they are en-
titled to be free from the restrictfon the moment the trustees convey 
the property.22 
The shift in the basis of equity jurisdiction against the promisor. 
In the restrictive agreement cases before Tulk v. M o~hay the· 
equity courts based their jurisdiction upon the threatened injury 
to the promisee's enjoyment of his own land in the vicinity and 
21 This might be of sentimental value to the occupants, and safeguard their own com· 
fort during their occupancy • 
.. If the restriction had been thu.• limited in duration. the lot purchasers might hav~ 
paid more than they would if the restriction was not so limited but whether they paid morct 
or less has no be:iring on the enforcibility of the rei;triction. 
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upon the inadequacy of the common law remedy to compensate for 
such an injury; and in Tulk v. Moxhay, where the court assumed 
without argument that they would have had jurisdiction to enjoin 
the promisor, there was such threatened injury. Since Tulk v. 
M oxha.y, however, there has been a change of attitude upon the 
part of the courts that is ·none the less curious because probably 
unconscious. In Peck v. Conwayza the master found as a fact that 
the violation of the restriction "would be no appreciable damage 
or injury to the plaintiff's premises". In discussing this, the court 
said: "Such an act of the defendants w~uld be against the restric-
tion by which they are bound, and a violation of the rights of 
the plaintiff, of which she cannot be deprived, because in the judg-
ment of others it is of little or no damage". In other words, the 
court apparently regarded the plaintiff as being substantially in the 
same position as if she had bargained for the fee instead of merely 
for the power to control the use of the land. That is, if she had 
contracted to buy tlie fee it would of course be no defense to a 
suit for specific performance that the plaintiff would be as well 
or better off without ~e land ; the fact that it is land is a sufficient 
reason in itself. Similarly, having bargained for a restriction on the 
land, she is now considered as having bought an interest in the 
land and the fact that she would not otherwise be damaged if she 
<lid not get specific performance is no longer considered important. 
In other words, she is considered as being the equitable owner of 
an interest in the servient land froni the moment the restriction is 
intended to become operative. · 
May there be an equitable servitude in gross? If the covenantee 
n~ed not show any threatened injury to his own premises in order 
to get an injunction, but need only to show that he has bargained 
for a restriction on the promisor's land, is it necessary that the 
promisee should have any land in the vicinity which might be 
benefitted? In Van Sant v. RostfM the plaintiffs had sold to the de-
fendant Frank Rose a lot with a restriction against erecting a flat 
or tenement building on tlie premises; the defendant Frank Rose 
conveyed the premises to his wife, Alvida Rose, and both defendants 
were proceeding to erect a flat building. In answer to a bill for 
an injunction the defendants set up that the plaintiffs did not at 
the time of filing their bill or for a long time prior thereto own 
other property anywhere in the vicinity or neighborhood that would 
be affected by a breach of the covenant. In giving the injunction 
:II (1876) IIO Mai:.._ 546. 
"(1012) l:TD·DL Allll· 572. (l!lll) a6o ill. 4DI. 
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the court argued that the purchaser presumably paid a less price 
because of the restriction and therefore the plaintiff ought to be 
allowed to enforce it to prevent the defendants from being un-
justly enriched; and that the plaintiff's motive in creating and at-
tempting to enforce the restriction was of no importance. If this 
reasoning25 were followed to its logical conclusion the plaintiffs 
would have been able to enforce a restriction even tho they had 
never owned any land in the vicinity except that which they sold 
to the defendant Frank Rose,26 indeed, even if the plaintiffs had 
never owned any land whatever but had bargained with the de-
fendant in some other way27 for the restriction. Whether the 
equity courts will take these last two steps and recognize to the 
full the doctrine of equitable servitudes in gross28 remains to be 
seen. The decision in Van Sant v. Rose is a striking example of 
the tendency of equity in the United States to become mechanical. 
While one having an estate in possession in the dominant prop-
erty can get an injunction without showing any damage to such 
property29 it has been held that one who has an estate in remainder 
or reversion after a life estate and is not the promisee must show 
that the breach would cause injury to his estate in order to get an 
injunction.30 This is analogous to common law protection of prop-
erty rights; a person in possession may bring trespass for a viola-
21 While this reasoning is open to criticism the decision might conceivably be sup-
ported on the ground that the plaintiff in requiring the covenant and in suing for an 
injunction intended to repre.•ent and did represent the property owners in the vicinity and 
that the injunction wa.• Riven to protect them. No hint of thi• appears in the case. 
'" In the suppose<t c;u;e ,._. in the actual ea.•e of Van Sant v. Ro.•e the purcha.•er prob-
ably paid a le."-• amount for the lot because of the restriction, hut just )low much is prob-
ably uncertain. Tf the iniunction were refused. would it be possible for the promisee to 
force the defaulting promisor to make good this deduction in a suit in auasi contract? 
It would l<eem that this ought to be allowed tho the Illinois Court of Appeals in Van 
Sant v. Rose said: "There can be no adequate recovery at law". The uncertainty of the 
amount ought not to be considered an in.ouperable obstacle to such relief. And if he can 
get such relief, is not this an argument against allowing the injunction to one who 
no longer ha.• any economic intere.•t in the neighborhood to be protected? 
"' If the defendant hai; bargained for a cash payment, the plaintiff's right in auasi 
contract seems clear. 
:a May the same equitable servitude be treated as both appurtenant and in gross? 
For CJC1mple, 1<uppo~e that in Van Sant v. Rose the plaintiffs at the time of the sale to 
Frank Rose had other property in the vicinity which they intended to protect by the 
restriction; later they sell this other property to X who does not wish to enforce the 
restriction; may the plaintiffs do so? In such a case it might well be said that the plain-
tiffs should not be entitled because if the defendant should be enriched it would be at the 
expense of X and not of the plaintiffs. But suppose that the promise was made expressly 
for the benefit of the plaintiffs' other land and also for the benefit of the plaintiffs per· 
sonally? If we follow the reasoning of Van Sant v. Rose it is difficult to see how the 
plaintiffs could be denied an injunction • 
., Dicken.•on v. Grand Junction Canal Co. (1852) IS Beav. 260. 
ao Johnstone v. Hall (1856) :: K. & J. 414-
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tion of the possession and recover judgment without proving any 
damage; the remainderman must bring an action on the case and 
prove damage to his estate in the land in order to recover. If the 
remainderman were also the promisee, he would not, of course, be 
under- the necessity of showing any such damage if Van Sant v. 
Rose should be followed. 
Equitable servitudes attaching to after acquired property. In 
Lewi,s v. Gollner31 one Gollner bought a lot in a residential section, 
intending to erect a tenement building; the plaintiff, representing 
-persons who owned residences in the neighborhood, sought to buy 
him out and did buy him out, for the sole purpose of saving the 
neighborhood from flats. The plaintiff paid Gollner $6,ooo more 
than Gollner had agreed to give for the lot, the latter agreeing that 
"he would not construct or erect any flats in plaintiff's immediate 
neighborhood or trouble him any more". Immediately afterward 
Gollner bought a lot diagonally opposite his first purchase and be-
gan erecting a seven-story flat. J;>laintiff's attorney threatened ac-
1ion and one of the materialmen refused to continue to supply him 
further, so Gollner sold and conveyed the premises to his wife who 
took with knowledge of all the facts and with the intention of 
-protecting her husband. The plaintiff sought an injunction against 
Collner and his wife; the lower court refused to give it but this 
was reversed by the upper court. It is to be observed here that 
.at the time the contract was entered into, the defendant Gollner 
11ad no land to which an equitable servitude could attach and con-
sequently there was, strictly speaking, no equitable servitude at 
that time. The court seemed to think that the contract created 
such a situation between the parties that an equitable servitude 
.came into existence the moment that Gollner acquired a piece of 
.land in the immediate neighborhood and would therefore be en-
forcible against a purchaser of the land with notice of the facts. 
This is somewhat analogous to the creation of a trust of after ac-
.quired property.32 The actual facts of the case did not require 
such reasoning; it was clear that Gollner's wife was colluding with 
nim to help him· escape the consequences of his contract and even 
-if the obligation of Gollner be considered as merely personal, dam-
ages at law being inadequate, the court properly enjoined the wife 
as well as Gollner. But if Gollner transferred to a stranger who 
"had no intent to aid Gollner to evade his contract but did know the 
facts, such a transferee could be enjoined only on the ground sug-
_gested by the court. 
"' (1891) 129 N. Y. 227. 
as Pratt v. Tuttle ( 1884) 1.16 Mass. 233. 
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Restrictive agreements as to a business. Tho the great bulk of 
.equitable servitudes consist of restrictions placed on one piece 
.of land, for the benefit of another piece of land,33 they may 
be imposed for the benefit of a business and if so intended the 
·benefit will pass to .the assignee of the business.34 Similarly, the 
'benefit of a personal covenant not to compete with the promisee 
·in business will- pass to the assignees of the promisee, if so in-
tended.8~ On the other hand, the restriction may be enforced 
.against the assignees of the covenantor's business. In Wilkes 
v. S pooner36 X sold to the plaintiff his business of general butcher, 
.covenanting not to establish a rival business within three miles. 
X also conducted a pork business at a nearby shop which he held 
.on lease. This lease X surrendered in order that his son, the de-
fendant, who bought the pork business with notice of this cove-
nant, might get a new lease and set up a business to compete 
with the plaintiff's. The real reason for enjoining the defendant 
·was that he was the assignee of the father's busines~not that he 
11appened to occupy the same building; tho the court seemed to 
put it on the latter ground, it is difficult to see how X, having only 
.a term for years, could create an equitable servitude on the land 
·which would outlast his lease. 
The formality essential .to the creation of equitable servitudes. 
Altho equitable servitudes are treated as technical property rights; 
i. e., they are enforced tho the plaintiff would suffer no damage 
to other land by a breach,-no particular formality is required for 
their creation. Thus not only is a seal not necessary37 but there 
is a conflict of authority as to whether any written memorandum 
·at all is necessary to comply with the Statute of Frauds.38 Further-
more, it is not important whether the restrictions take the fonn 
of covenants,39 reservations, or conditions.40 
""This is a convenient figure of speech; legal rights and obligations may strictly be 
predicated only of human beings. 
"'Abergarw Brewery Co. v. Holmes (1900) l Ch. 188 • 
.. Francisco v. Smith (1894) I43 N. Y .. 488. As the court pointed out, since the 
benefit passed to the assignee of the business, no injunction can be granted if the busi-
ness is discontinued; but a discontinuance does not put an end to the right but merely 
suspends the enforcement, so that if the business is later resumed the covenantor can then 
be enjoined. Clegg v. Hands (I890) 44 Ch. D. 503. 
"'(I9Io) 24 L. T .. R. I57: fioII] 2 K. D. 473: 24 Harv. Law Rev. 574. 
"'Dorr v. Harrahan (1860) IOI Ma«.•. 53I • 
.. See Browne, Statute of Frauds (4th ed.) § 269; but see 5 Harv. Law Rev. 278: 
"If the act.• and the land are <tated in writing. the court con<iderJ< the statute satisfied, and 
will gather the other terms of the re.•triction by reading the writing as a whole in the 
light of •urrounding circumstance.•." 
a1 Peck v. Conway ( 1876) II9 l\fass. 546. 
"Parker v. Nightingale (I863) 6 Allen 34I: 5 Harv .. Law Rev. 277 .. 
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But altho form may not be essential it is as a practical matter 
very important in drawing up instruments containing restrictions, 
that express stipulations be made. If the covenantee wishes to 
make certain that his transferees may take advantage of the re-
striction, the safest way is to have an express provision in the deed 
that it is for the benefit of the land ; if he fails to do this, it will 
then become a question of construction for the.court. In Tallmadge 
\'.East River Bank41 it was held that if the sale was made with ref-
erence to a plat showing the restriction, that was enough. And in 
Peck v. Conway42 and Barrow v. Richard48 it was decided that if 
on a fair construction of the whole instrument an intention to bene• 
fit the land appeared, that was sufficient.44 If the seller intended to 
sell all the property and not retain any himself, this fact tends 
strongly to show that the restriction was meant to benefit the future 
owners of the land.45 
Whether equitable servitudes may require affirmative action. 
With the exception of the spurious common law easement of fenc-
ing, common law easements require no action on the part of the 
owner of the servient property.46 An equitable servitude, on the 
other hand, may impose a duty to act tho the court may as a 
practical matter refuse relief.47 If the act is of such a nature as to 
require little or no supervision, enforcement will be decreed ; e. g. 
in Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples/8 where the covenant was to pay 
the grantor or his assignee one-fifth of flowage damages caused 
by a reservoir dam. On the other hand, if the act is such as to 
require a great deal of supervision, equity will usually refuse· re-
Cl (I862) 26 N. Y. In~. 
a '1876) IIQ Mas.•. 546. 
a (I840) 8 Paige 35I. 
" s Harv. Law Rev. 278: "The ownership and character of buildings in the neighbor• 
hood, plans, building schemes, the existence of similar restrictions upon other lots, even 
parol agreements among neighbors, may be shown as bearing upon the probable intention 
of the contractin2 parties." 
"See the discussion of mutual covenants, post p. IOI. And see Nottingham Co. v. 
Butler (I886} I6 Q. B. D. 778. 
.. Tiffany, Real Property, § 3I2. 
" Because of the difficulty of supervision and the interference with the personal 
liberty of the defendant. It is a question to be decided as a matter of the balance of con· 
venience. See s Harv. Law Rev. 278, 279. 
"(I895) I64 Mass. 3I9. See also Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co. v. McKinney (I906) I24 Ga. 
929, in which a covenant to convey water to the covenantee's residence was enforced 
against the covenantoI'R ai;sip;neeR. In Cle11:11: v. HandR (I890) 44 Ch. ,D. 503, a covenant 
by a !CRsee to buy beer only of the lessor was indirectly enforced in favor of the lessoI's 
assip;nee.• bv enioininp; the lCR.•ee from buvinp; beer el~ewhere. It thus combines the 
peculiar principles of both Tullc v. Moxhay and Lumley v. Wap;ner (I852) I De Gex, 
:M. & G 604. See I4 Harv. Law Rev. 30I. 
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lief as a matter of the balance of convenience unless the hardship 
on the plaintiff would be very great if relief were denied.'9 
Mutual covenants in general building schemes. Another illus-
tration of the non-technical way in which equitable servitudes may 
be created is shown in the rules applying to mutual covenants in 
general buildipg schemes. In Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile 
Co. v. Butler0 thirteen lots were put up at auction, subject to cer-
tain sale conditions as to the use of the land, which were also ex-
pressed in the deeds of conveyance to the various purchasers. It 
was held that since the grantor intended to sell and did sell the 
whole property, the restrictions were evidently meant to benefit 
each lot as against all the others, and equity would effectuate this 
intention. 51 In Barrow v. Richard52 it did not appear that the 
vendor intended to sell all his property in the vicinity, but in each 
of the conveyances which he made there was included a condition 
against the property being used for "any other manufactory, trade, 
or business whatsoever which should or might be in anywise of-
fensive to the neighboring inhabitants". This was held to be suf-
ficient to show an intention to benefit each of the lots soldn against 
the others. The court in this case admitted that the plaintiff could 
not recover _at law ;5' and it must be admitted that it would have 
been difficult if not impossible to have worked out any principle at 
common law which would allow the purchaser of the lot first sold 
to enforce against a purchaser of another lot a covenant which was 
not in existence at the time of the sale of the first lot. Equity, 
however, is able to and does carry out the intention of the partiesn 
41 Haywood v. Brun.•wick Building Society (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 403, covenant to keep in 
repair not enforced against assignee • 
.. (1886) 16 Q. B. D. 778. 
01 The fact that the lots were not sold on the same day and the further fact that some 
were sold at private sale were held to be unimportant since it was a general scheme. See 
Collins v. Castle (188;.) 36 Ch. Div. 243. 
u (1840) 8 Paige 351. 
a As to whether other "neighboring inhabitants" not purchasers from the vendor, 
might enjoin as expressly intended beneficiaries of the contract, Quaere • 
.. This wM before the famous ca.•e of Lawrence v. Fox (1859) 20 N. Y. 268, which 
gave a payment beneficiary of a contract a right to sue thereon; but it is at least doubtful 
whether the present New York.law would regard the plaintiff as coming within the prin· 
ciple of that case. 
"' See 6 Harv. Law Rev. 290; 12 Col. Law Rev. 159. In Child v. Douglas (1854) 
Kay 560 it is suggested that the later purchasers are assignees from the vendors of the 
benefit of the covenants made by the earlier purchasers; but this does not explain the 
obligation of the later purchasers to the earlier. In Parker v. Nightingale (1863) 6 Allen 
34r it was held that since the vendor was only a dry trustee of the covenants for each of 
the covenants for each of the purchasers he need not be joined. The purchasers would 
seem to be beneficiaries of the contract rather than cestuis que trust, however. That mutual 
covenants may exist without a sale but merely by agreement between two owners of neigh· 
boring property, see Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch (1877) '/ON. Y. 440. 
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by allowing the purchaser of any lot to enforce the restriction 
against the purchaser of any other lot. 56 In such a building scheme, 
however, each lot is treated as a unit; hence, if it is later divided, 
one part of the lot can not enforce against the other p~rt ;51 but each 
part _may enforce the restriction against any other lot or part thereof 
or vice versa. 
While it seems to be an unsettled question whether in the ordinary 
case a covenant will bind after acquired property of the cove-
nantor, 58 it has recently been held in a general building scheme 
case that after adquired property may be bound at least in the hands 
of a transferee. In Schmidt v. Palisade Supply Co.,59 X, the owner 
of land, projected a definite building scheme, including in his project 
land to which he had no title. He later acquired this land and 
conveyed a part of it to the defendant, subject to the restrictions 
of the general plan. It was held that a purchaser of part of the 
land originally owned could enforce the restriction against the de-
fendant.60 
Failure of purpose of restriction. Tho the plaintiff may get 
an injunction without showing damage to his other property, he 
may be refused preventive relief where it is not possible thereby 
to secure to the plaintiff the ·benefit intended. In Jackson v. Steven-
son, 61 lots had been sold in I865 under a general building scheme 
with restrictions against the use of the lots for trade or business 
purposes. After I873 the character of that portion of the city 
changed from a residential to a business district. In I89I the plain-
tiff sought an injunction but was refused because the court's decree 
could not restore the residential character of the neighborhood, and 
would therefore be practically futile. 
The court, however, did not dismiss the bill but retained it for 
the sake of assessing damages. This is to be justified only upon 
•Tho equitable servitudes have grown out of the specific performance of contracts it 
may be questioned whether it is at the present time necessary for the existence of equitable 
servitudes, that there be any common law contract right against any one. For example, 
if A has only ten lots and he sells them all at one auction according to a building scheme 
it is at least doubtful whether there is any personal liability on any one. If there is not, 
then the situation is analogous to a conveyance of land with a reservation of a common 
law easement or of a rent charge. 
IT King v. Dickeson (1889) 40 Ch. D. 596; Barney v. Everard (1900) 67 N. Y. Supp. 
535. See 7 Col. Law Rev. 623. 
13 See ante, p. 98. 
"' (1912) 84 Atl. 807 (N. J.): 13 Col. Law Rev. 77. 
11 It is an interesting question whether X himself would be bound by the general 
restrictions as to the after acquired land. There seem to be no cases. 
a (1892) 156 Mass. 496. Sec also McClure v. Lcaycraft (1905) 183 N. Y. 36, 19 
Harv. Law Rev. 305. Also see Columbia College v. Thacher 87 N. Y. 3n where the 
change had come about after suit was brought but before decree. · 
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-the ground that the servitude has not actually come to an end but 
that it is merely unenforcible because of practical difficulties. The 
court in McClure v. Leaycraft ,supra, seemed to proceed upon the 
same theory i!l suggesting that the plaintiff could recover dam.ages at 
law. It is difficult to understand this last suggestion because the 
defendant was not the original covenantor but a purchaser from 
him; but it is understandable to allow the plaintiff a sum of money 
in equity as compensation for an equitable property right which 
:the equity court in its discretion refuses to enforce. In Amerman v. 
Deane62 the trial court having awarded $1,500 in lieu of an in-
junction the upper court ordered that the plaintiff should not get 
the amotint unless she executed to the defendant a release of the 
.servitude. 
Public policy agai,nst enforcing restriction. A contract not to 
compete with the promisee may be invalid at law and therefore not 
·enforcible in equity because contrary to public policy in favor of 
freedom of competition: For the same reason a court of equity 
may refuse to enforce an equital?le servitude. In Norcross v. 
James,63 one K conveyed to F .a quarry, retaining the surrounding 
land. In the conveyance there was a covenant not to open .any 
.quarry on the land retained. Plaintiff, a subsequent transferee of 
the quarry, sought to have the covenant enforced against a s~bse­
quent transferee of the sui:rounding land. Relief was refused on 
the ground that it would tend to create a monopoly for the plain-
tiff. Whether, however, the restriction is against public policy 
·ought to be determined on the facts of each case; there is nothing 
in the report of the case to show that the restriction would in-
jure the public,6' tho that might have been the fact; e. g. if the 
stone were a peculiar sort which the public could not get on the 
market. If, however, the stone were quite common and easily pro-
.cured by the public, there would seem to be no satisfactory reason 
for refusing relief.6G 
Equitable servitudes upon and for the benefit of chattels. It may 
be very important for the vendor or lessor of a chattel to impose 
:restrictions upon the use of the chattel in the hands of the lessee 
·and his assignees or upon the sale of it in the hands of the pur-
a (1892) 132 N. Y. 355. 
a (1885) 140 Mass. 188 • 
.. In Burdell v. Grandi (1907) 152 Cal 376, the owner of a large tract of land divided 
it into lots and conveyed them to different purchasers by deeds containing covenants by 
the vendors not to sell intoxicating liquors;- the purpose was to protect his own saloon 
-from competition. The covenants were held void as creating a monopoly. See 21 Harv. 
Law Rev. 450. See also Brewer v. :Marshall (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 537 • 
.. In the very similar case of Hodge v. Sloan (1887) 107 N. Y. 244 relief was given; 
.the question of monopoly seems not to have been raised. 
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chaser and his assignees. A few cases have enforced such restric-
tions, thus carrying out the intent of the parties. In Murphy v. 
Christian Press Association Publishing Co.66 the plaintiff bought 
of the Catholic Publieation Society a set of electrotype plates, cove-
nanting that it would not sell plates to any one else, and that it 
would not sell books at less than a certain price. Later the Society 
was dissolved and the receivers sold the plates to the defendant who 
knew of the agreement. The defendant published and sold books 
at a less price than the Society agreed to sell; the ·plaintiff was 
granted an injunction. Here the covenantee was not the business 
because the_ defendant did not buy out the business but merely the 
plates and copyright, so that the dominant property here was the 
plates sold and the servient property was the plates retained. It 
is to be observed that the chattels involved here were protected by 
the copyright law ; it is also held that the price of patented articles 
may be similarly controlled.67 It was for a while contended68 that 
the same rule should be applied to proprietary articles such as so-
. called patent medicines where there was a trade secret involved; 
but the present tendency is in favor of holding restrictions in such 
cases invalid.89 Where neither statutory nor natural monopoly is 
involved the public interest in free trade in chattels should a 
fortiori prevent the upholding of such restrictions. 
Effect of plaintiff's default of acquiescence. Like other incor::-
poreal property rights, an equitable servitude may be released by 
the owner of the dominant property and thereby extinguished ;70 
whether the failure of the purpose of a restriction puts an end to 
the right or merely to the plaintiff's equitable· remedy thereon has 
already been discussed.71 A plaintiff may, of course, be estopped 
by observing without objection the defendant's expenditure of 
money in violating the restriction, tho it is at least doubtful whether 
ee (1899) 38 N. Y. App. 426. See also N. Y. Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Co. 
(1895) 83 Hun. 593; 20 Harv. Law Rev. 335. 
"'See Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman (1907) 153 Fed. 24 and cases cited. 
"' See 17 Harv. Law Rev. 415. 
"'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. (19n) 220 U. S. 373; Price Restriction 
on the Re-sale of Chattels, by William J. Shroeder, 25 Harv. Law Rev. 59-69. Mr. 
Shroeder's argument is that while the protection of the statutory monopoly of the patentee 
and copyright owner extends to the chattels produced thereunder, the natural monopoly 
of the possessor of a secret exists only so long as the secret is preserved and has no rela· 
tion to the article manufactured by its use when once it is offered as a subject of com· 
merce; that while the owner of the statutory monopoly gives the benefit of his discovery 
to the public after a certain period, the owner of a trade secret gives nothing to the 
public for his protection against fraudulent discovery or disclosure; 
"Tiffany, Real Property, 1215· 
n See ante, p. 102. 
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this would bar the plaintiff from objecting to further violations.T2 
Where the restrictions are mutual a plaintiff may be barred because 
he has himself violatetj. the restriction upon his own land ;Ta and 
where a landlord imposed building restrictions upon several tenants 
for their mutual benefit as well as his own and so failed to enforce 
them against some of the tenants that the object of the restrictions 
was defeated it was held that he had lost the power to enforce 
against others.T4 While mutual restrictions may come to an end by 
mutual abandonment, a modification of the restrictions may be 
made by all the parties without extinguishing the restrictions.Tis 
GEORGE L. Cr.ARK. 
University of Missouri Law School. 
12 Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. (1858) II Gray 359. 
12 Coates v. Cullingford (19n) 131 N. Y. Supp. 700; 12 Col. Law Rev. 158. 
"Roper v. Williams (1822) Turn. & R. 18. See also Ocean City Ass'n v. Chalfant 
(1903) 65 N. J. Eq. 156, restrictions against trade or business on Sunday; 17 Harv. Law 
Rev. 138; 4 Col. Law Rev. 73. 
ts See Sanford v. Keer (1912) So N. J. 240, where it was held that building a garage 
on that portion of the lot intended for a dwelling house was not protected by a modifica-
tion allowing necessary or desirable outbuildings. 
